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WARDLOW'S CASE: A CALL TO BROADEN THE PERSPEC-
TIVE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
DAVID SEAWELL
INTRODUCTION
Sam saw Timothy, turned, and ran. Timothy saw Sam run, fol-
lowed, and caught him. Timothy frisked Sam and found a gun. Sam
went to a suppression hearing, a trial, a sentencing hearing, and finally
jail.'
The events above began shortly after noon on September 9, 1995, at
4035 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois. Sam is Sam Wardlow, a
44-year-old African-American man and previously convicted felon.
Timothy is Officer Timothy Nolan, a white member of the Chicago Po-
lice Department. The reading-primer-simple actions of these two drama-
tis personae have been described and argued in four forums and for as
many years since they occurred. These events culminated in a final per-
formance in the grandest judicial venue this country has to offer: the
United States Supreme Court. Before the performance, legal dramatur-
gists and critics from all over the country submitted thirteen reviews
through briefs of amicus curiae to help instruct the nine-person audience.
While many of the reviews focused on the plot of the case, there was a
great deal of rhetoric concerning the setting. Only two, however, dis-
cussed the racial and cultural identities of the principal characters.
It is the discussion of setting and identity that concerns this present
paper. Officer Nolan and the Illinois District Attorney's office argued
that the events occurred in a "high-crime area."2 This fact, combined with
the flight of Mr. Wardlow, they say, justified the officer in stopping the
suspect.3 They frame this argument pursuant to the guidelines established
in Terry v. Ohio,4 stating that location plus evasion gave an officer articu-
lable reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot.5
The trial court ruled in favor of the state. Sam was sentenced to two
years on the charge of possession of a handgun by a felon.6 The Appel-
I. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 485 (11. 1998).
2. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 17-19, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brier].
3. See id
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 2, at 17.
6. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 484.
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late Court of Illinois reversed the conviction on limited grounds,7 and this
decision was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.8
The first part of this paper sets the framework for the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. In order to understand the concepts argued and decided in
Wardlow, it is first necessary to understand the underlying legal
precedent. This section will trace the history of "stop and frisk"
jurisprudence, highlighting cases that have focused on location and eva-
sion analysis.
The second section argues against the reasoning of the State of Illi-
nois, its amici, and all the reviewing courts, as all believe, either explic-
itly or implicitly, that the issue of location should be meaningful in de-
termining articulable reasonable suspicion under Terry. The issue of lo-
cation should be eliminated from Terry analysis for three reasons. First,
the statistical "objective" data relied on to determine a high-crime area,
while possibly an effective tool for safe, efficient police work, is too ripe
for racially discriminatory abuses in the court room. Second, the subjec-
tive bias of police officers perpetuates the discriminatory impact. Third,
the use of location in this area will heighten the animosity between inner-
city police forces and the racial minorities within their districts.
The final section will focus on the aspect of flight. The use of flight
in Terry analysis, while difficult to eliminate from consideration, has
problems in the light of racially biased policing in high-crime areas. I
will discuss whether or not, for minority populations, there can be such a
thing as unprovoked flight. I will also argue that the concept of flight
pursuit cuts against one of the foundations of Terry. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, flight is less indicative of wrongdoing in a high
crime area.
I. TERRYTO WARDLOW
The primary issue in Wardlow is one of suppression -- that is,
whether the gun found on Sam Wardlow by Officer Nolan was properly
admitted into evidence during the bench trial, or if it should have been
excluded because it violated the Fourth Amendment's protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The gun constituted the entirety of
the physical evidence presented at the trial, and both the prosecution and
the defendant stipulated to the facts of the case as described by Officer
Nolan. If the gun was admitted properly, Sam's conviction should stand;
if the gun was unreasonably obtained, the conviction should be vacated.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 489.
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Due to the factual stipulation, the appellate court and all subsequent
courts reviewed the issue de novo.
9
During Wardlow's appeal, the prosecution argued that the subject's
flight and location in a high-crime area were satisfactorily specific facts
that justified pursuit, detention and frisk of Sam and his effects.'0 The
appellate court disagreed and limited the holding to the issue of flight."
The court found no support in the record that Sam was located in a high-
crime area at the time of his flight." Therefore, the court relied on Illinois
precedent, holding that flight alone is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. 3
The appellate court stated in dicta that if the area of arrest could be
proven to be a high-crime area, a stop might have been justified. " Thus,
the appellate court recognized the legal significance that a high-crime
area could have on a determination of articulable reasonable suspicion.
However, the court was unable to determine if the area of 4035 West
Van Buren fell into that category.
Both courts analyzed the stop under the Terry stop rubric of the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Illinois did not perceive the
same confusion over high-crime areas as the lower court. The court ruled
that flight alone in a high-crime area does not justify an investigatory
detention and affirmed and expanded the limited holding of the court of
appeals.'-'
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Terry v. Ohio. 6 With Terry the Court performed a retread on traditional
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. By placing the government
interest in crime prevention and the private interest to be free from intru-
sion on the balance, the Warren Court gave the stamp of reasonableness
to certain seizures made with suspicion that did not rise to the level of
probable cause to arrest.'7 Technically, the decision in Terry represents
nothing more than an additional exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. But Terry casts the warrant requirement in a new
light. As Justice Douglas points out in his dissent, the ruling in Terry
allows a police officer on the street to perform an act that a judge or
magistrate could not authorize, as all warrants must issue from probable
18
cause.
9. Id. at 485.
10. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 2, at 19.
11. People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65,68 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
12. Id. at 67-68.
13. Id. at 68.
14. Id.
15. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 488-89.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See id. at 22.
18. Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11212001]
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The defense in Terry sought to exclude from evidence a gun found
on the defendant because it was found and seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness clause. 9 Detective McFadden of the
Cleveland Police Department discovered the gun on Terry in a search of
his person. 20 McFadden suspected Terry and two associates of casing a
store in preparation for an armed hold-up.' McFadden based this suspi-
cion on a lengthy observation of Terry and his associates.2 McFadden
watched as Terry and another man walked back and forth in front of a
store window a dozen times. 3 As Terry left the scene, McFadden stopped
the two men and patted down the outside of their garments. McFadden
found a pistol in Terry's breast pocket.f After classifying the stop as
investigatory, the trial court convicted Terry of carrying a concealed
weapon.2 The Court of Agpeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed Terry's appeal.
The prosecution in Terry argued that the requirement of probable
cause was too rigid for police to respond adequately to the dangers posed
on the urban streets.2' As a result, state legislatures began enacting stat-
utes that authorized police stop and frisk procedures on grounds less than
probable cause. 9 Terry has been described as a judicial response to the
increased violence of the inner cities and the pressing public demand for
increased law and order.3° The response by the Court created a reduced
standard of suspicion for on-street detentions and a greater deference to
the decisions of the beat cop.
The balancing test in Terry originated from the 1967 administrative
search case, Camara v. Municipal Court.3 Camara concerned the inspec-
tion of a residence by a municipal health agency without a warrant. The
Court found the administrative search unconstitutional, but in so doing
defined the Fourth Amendment concept of reasonableness.33 Without
citation, Justice White wrote that determining reasonableness requires a
squaring of the need to search with the burden of invasion upon the sub-
19. See id. at 5.
20. ld. at 7.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
29. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1968).
30. David Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Poor and Black Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 663 (1994).
31. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
32. Id. at 525-26.
33. Id. at 536-37.
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ject of the search?4 One year later the Terry Court applied this test to
determine the reasonableness of a warrantless seizure.
To strike the balance between the two interests, Terry applied an ob-
jective standard by which police officers could perform limited searches
based on reduced suspicion. 35 This objective standard has come to be
known as reasonable articulable suspicion.
Reasonable articulable suspicion as stated in Terry is a guide for po-
lice officers and courts to determine what constitutes a reasonable stop
and frisk under the Fourth Amendment. To prove that the stop and frisk
was reasonably warranted, the detaining officer must be able to point to
articulable facts and their rational inferences." In deciding whether to
admit or suppress the fruit of Terry stops, trial judges must ask, "would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate?
37
While the standard of reasonable articulable suspicion is more flexi-
ble than the arrest standard of probable cause, it is limited. The standard
is not the functional equivalent of a gumshoe's hunch. Moreover, unlike
other warrant exceptions, an officer's good faith is insufficient to keep
evidence from being suppressed absent reasonable articulable suspicion.
Since Terry, the Court has found occasion to decide cases where factors
supporting stop and frisks did not rise to the level of reasonable articu-
lable suspicion.39
Brown v. Texas4° involved the stop and search of a man in an area of
El Paso, Texas, with a high incidence of drug trafficking.4' However, the
arresting officers could not point to any specific facts that led them to
believe criminal conduct was taking place.42 The officers merely stated
that the defendant was in a high-crime area and "looked suspicious." 3
The Court found that mere presence in a high-crime area, without more,
does not justify a finding of articulable reasonable suspicion."
Following Terry, courts applied the reasonable articulable suspicion
standard to the search and seizure cases before them. However, it was
another thirteen years before the U.S. Supreme Court provided guide-
34. Id. at 534-35.
35. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 21-22.
38. Id. at 22.
39. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366
(1993).
40. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id.
43. d at 52.
44. Id.
20011 1123
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lines to determine the presence of the objective standard. While Terry
and its progeny defined reasonable articulable suspicion, the definition
proved elusive without a practical test for determining which facts were
articulable enough to be considered in Terry cases.45
In United States v. Cortez, the Court finally articulated the test for
determining reasonable articulable suspicion: totality of the circum-
stances.' That is, under this test, all facts at the officer's disposal at the
time of the detention are taken into consideration. 47 The defendants in
Cortez were found guilty of six counts of transporting illegal aliens. 4
Border Patrol Officers in Arizona stopped the defendants' van based on a
two-month investigation of border crossings, which began with analysis
of footprints in the sand.49
Cortez opens the door to all information an officer can marshal to
support the basis of his suspicion. The facts supporting the suspicion can
be purely benign or extrinsic to the particular suspect." The Court re-
frains from viewing the facts as a detached scholar, but rather from the
perspective of law enforcement professionals. The Court believes that
certain factors, seemingly innocuous to the layperson, give rise to a rea-
sonable suspicion to the trained eye and mind of a professional police
officer. Cortez recognizes and accepts that the Terry standard allows for
probabilities and rarely relies on hard certainties." Based on Cortez,
courts must analyze Terry decisions on a case-by-case basis without a
bright line rule.
Doctrinally, Illinois v. Wardlow is not earth shattering. Both parties
to the controversy besought the Court to establish one per se rule or an-
other and the Court unanimously refused both requests.52 The Court nei-
ther expanded nor contracted the scope of the totality of the circum-
stances test. It weighed all factors as stated by officer Nolan against Mr.
Wardlow's private interest, and in a 5-4 decision, ruled in favor of Offi-
cer Nolan's actions. 3 The factors of location and evasion were found to
equal reasonable articulable suspicion.4
One basis for the majority's decision was Officer Nolan's
characterization of the area in which Wardlow was stopped. Taking its
cue from the Illinois Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that the area of 435 West Van Buren represented a high-crime area.5 ' As
45. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981).
46. Id. at 417-18.
47. Id..
48. d at 416.
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 418.
51. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
52. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 124.
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area of 435 West Van Buren represented a high-crime area.55 As dis-
cussed above, location alone does not rise to the level of reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion. 6 However, the Court recognized in Adams v. Wil-
liams that an individual's presence in an area known for a high incidence
of crime can be a factor in determining the validity of a Terry stop.5 The
character of the area in Adams played a factor in determining the propri-
ety of the search and not the initial stop.-" In Wardlow, the reasonable-
ness of the stop was the sole issue; the Court did not reach the validity of
the search." Nevertheless, the nature of a given area has been used to
determine the objective standard for a stop.60
A. High-crime Areas
The legal recognition of a high-crime area for the purpose of Terry
stops is significant. If articulable reasonable suspicion can be seen as a
group of specific factors that lower one's expectation of privacy and di-
minish the personal freedom from police intrusion, then the expectation
of privacy is automatically a notch lower for residents of high-crime ar-
eas. This is true even if mere presence alone doesn't justify a detention.
61
The high-crime area label should be stricken from the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis in Terry decisions as not cognizable in a legitimate
manner. It is open to racial manipulation by the officers who utilize it
and injurious to the communities which receive the label.
B. Who Lives In A High-crime Area?
"If an honest citizen resides in a neighborhood heavily populated by
criminals, just as the chances are high that he might be one, so too are the
chances high that he might be mistaken for one." 62 In their Brief of
Amicus Curiae in support of the State of Illinois to the U.S. Supreme
Court, a caucus of law enforcement organizations attempts to explain
what constitutes a high-crime area for law enforcement purposes, and the
method by which a location receives such a distinction.63 The organiza-
tions point to numerous bits of data that when compiled allow the en-
forcement agencies to pin point geographical areas that have tendencies
towards certain types of criminal activity. 64 This datum includes arrest
55. d at 124.
56. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
57. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972).
58. See id
59. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 n.2.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Brignone-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975).
61. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
62. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCErY 218 (1966).
63. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Police Officers et al. at 19-21, Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (98-1036) [hereinafter NAPO Briefl.
64. Id
2001] 1125
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statistics, citizen complaints, officer observations and numbers of crimes
committed. The brief goes on to show how these quantitative and quali-
tative factors have been demonstrably useful to law enforcement agen-
cies around the country in their efforts to curb crime. 6 Also included are
statistical reports of crimes committed in Chicago, broken down by po-
lice district. The brief concludes that the 11' District of Chicago, the
District having the thirteenth highest crime rate in the city, is a high-
crime area.68
The NAPO brief seems to state that this is an obvious conclusion.
The assumption is where a geographical location has a worse crime rate
(even marginally) than half of the other districts in a given locale, it is a
high-crime area.
Difficulty in labeling high-crime areas poses a legitimate problem to
accepting the designation as a specific factor. However, even if it were
possible to objectively determine the criteria in a neutral manner, it
would not necessarily mean that the criteria would produce a race-neutral
result. In many situations of racial jurisprudence, objectively neutral
standards have been seen to produce a racially disadvantaging result.
9
The purported objective standard of location is nevertheless open to ra-
cial discrimination due to the current inability of defendants to raise
claims of disparate racial impact, and the practical impossibility of dem-
onstrating the disparate impact of Terry stops.
In her article, Race and the Fourth Amendment, Tracy Maclin dis-
cusses the pervasive reluctance of courts to entertain arguments of dispa-
rate racial impact in terms of the Fourth Amendment.70 Professor
Maclin-who also authored the ACLU's Brief of Amicus Curiae in sup-
port of Sam Wardlow-focuses her attention on the impact of racial
profiling in traffic stops and automobile searches.7 She shows that for
years highway patrols have disproportionately targeted minority drivers
for pretextual traffic stops in an effort to curb drug trafficking on the
eastern seaboard. 72 Judges have traditionally disfavored deciding Fourth
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21-26.
67. Id. at app. at 1.
68. Id. at 19.
69. See generally Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination though
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED ThE MOVEMENT 43-45 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)
(discussing the racially adverse impact of an objective employment test in Washington v. Davis, 476
U.S. 229 (1976) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
70. 51 VAND. L. REv. 333 (1998).
71. Id. at 340-41.
72. See id. at 350 (showing that on a highway where minorities composed 24.3% of the




Amendment issues on grounds of racially based police motives due to a
perceived lack of the relevance to race in the overall standard of reason-
ablenessi3
Some might argue that this court practice is justifiable. The argument
might suggest that criminal cases are solipsistic in nature, focusing on the
individual and that the alleged crime statistics only demonstrate aggre-
gate probabilities. In this sense, whether or not a law enforcement agency
typically discriminates against minorities is immaterial as to whether or
not the specific defendant looked reasonably suspicious to the individual
officer. The only time evidence should be suppressed is upon a clear
showing of racial discrimination on the part of the specific officer. How-
ever, this argument fails when considering the relevance of the high-
crime area label. If the Court allows evidence or factors not specific to a
defendant, like presence in a high-crime area, they depart from only
looking at the individual and his crime, and look instead to the probable
suggestions from his environment or surroundings. Under this view, offi-
cers may use the character of the suspect's environment to justify a stop,
but the suspect cannot use the character of the officer's environment to
refute the justification. In other words, "[t]he Court's Fourth Amendment
logic should not be unidirectional."74
C. Intelligent Bayesians in Blue
Anticipating possible race based arguments, the NAPO brief offered
a conjunctive solution to the racial problems of high-crime designation.
The NAPO contends that through strict statistical analysis and officer
experience with the day-to-day workings of the area, the alleged racial
injustices will be laid asunder. 75 The first provision of the conjunction
was discussed above. This section argues that relying on officers to de-
termine what neighborhoods are high-crime areas allows geographic
locations to be labeled high-crime due to the racial makeup of the popu-
lation.
In Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism, Jody Armour describes
various manifestations of post civil rights racism. One of these manifes-
tations Armour calls the Intelligent Bayesian. 7 According to Armour, the
Bayesian justifies his racist viewpoints based on statistical data and eco-
nomic decision-making. 7 The Bayesian argues that his race-based stereo-
types are merely substitutes for other factors that statistically coincide
with race.7' The only reason race is utilized by the Bayesian is because it
73. See id. at 338.
74. Id. at 374.
75. NAPO Brief, supra note 63, at 27.
76. JODY DAVID ARMOUR NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 35-61 (1997).
77. See i& at 36.
78. See id.
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is easier to ascertain someone's race than education, income or social
status. 79 The Bayesian contends that his world assessinents are reasonable
because they are statistically justified.8° Under this view, race need not be
the factor that the stereotype rests on; instead, it could be any of the fac-
tors that are most readily determinable. Armour suggests that if a Bayes-
ian is cognizant of the correlation between poverty and crime, he will be
more on guard in locations that demonstrate lower economic health, and
race becomes a non-issue." While Armour goes on to refute this argu-
ment in ways that will be addressed in section D, it becomes necessary to
analyze whether or not race can become a non-issue in the question of
high-crime areas.
Richard Delgado examines how American society has fabricated
stereotypes about crime.s2 Delgado argues that the white majority has
assigned and reinforced the stereotype that blacks, especially young men,
are inexorably linked to violent and interpersonal property crimes, to
justify exertion of control over the group. 3 While Delgado's reasoning is
novel, the concept of "black crime" is not. Delgado effectively points out
that the equation of blacks and crime is as pervasive in American culture
as teenagers and consumerism. 4 Even the NAPO brief recognizes the
high correlation between crime and minority groups stating, "many high-
crime areas are in or [near] urban neighborhoods with large racial or eth-
nic minority populations. ' '" The NAPO brief does not refer to the corre-
lation between poverty and crime. Even if a Bayesian does factor eco-
nomic status into the assessment of high-crime areas, it is not likely that
economic determinations will displace racial stereotypes, due to the per-
vasive social recognition and acceptance of the latter.
The NAPO brief contended that police officers relying on their
heightened training and ability to evaluate situations are better trained
than the general public to ascertain the likelihood of crime in the urban
arena.' This might suggest while Bayesians might exist in the civilian
members of a community, the training of law enforcement officers effec-
tively diminishes the likelihood that they exist among those who serve
and protect our cities. Police work is a demanding and dangerous
occupation. Our law enforcement officers are required to make
instantaneous decisions with dire consequences attached to their actions,
especially in cases involving flight of a potentially dangerous person like
the case of Mr. Wardlow. If the Intelligent Bayesian argument makes any
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 45.
82. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears - On the Social
Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994).
83. Id. at 511.
84. See generally id.
85. NAPO Brief, supra note 63, at 23.
86. Id. at 16.
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Mr. Wardlow. If the Intelligent Bayesian argument makes any sense at
all, it does so in its ability to streamline the decision making process.
Therefore, the public should expect a greater representation of Bayesians
within communities called on to make such rash and important decisions.
Moreover, as the police have greater access to the demographic and
criminal statistics involved in the creation of the Bayesian's argument,
the justification for the racist inclination is substantial.
If the above argument is true, it is difficult to fault our police forces
for such a prevalent problem in our society when the very nature of the
job increases their susceptibly to fall victim to racist tendencies. We
should not, however, legitimate these practices by giving these rash and
possibly discriminatory decisions the power of law. Therefore, when the
case moves from the street to the relative serenity of the courtroom, our
legal system should attempt to counteract the discriminatory and injuri-
ous harshness of the urban landscape. This can only be accomplished
through a refusal to recognize arbitrary and racially laden distinctions
like high-crime areas.
D. What's at Stake?
Fuck tha police, comin' straight from the Undergroun'
A young nigga' got it bad 'cause I'm brown. 87
The previous two sections have focused on the use and application of
high-crime areas with regard to parties in the criminal justice system.
Now it is time to look at how high-crime distinctions impact the commu-
nities themselves, especially the law-abiding members of those commu-
nities. This section discusses how high the cost of perceived arbitrary law
enforcement actually is on minority communities. The high-crime area
designation will further compound these perceptions and costs. The costs
and their exacerbation are so injurious as to render the high-crime label
inherently unreasonable.
The writings by the authors in this field have polarized on the axis of
how much of the nation's resources should be spent curbing crime in
neighborhoods that intersect a high crime rate with a high population of
racial minorities. "Law and Order Cheerleaders"8 like Randall Kennedy
espouse the view that minority communities actually benefit from
heightened police scrutiny because minorities are the usual victims of
minority crime. 9 On the opposite end, Critical Race theorists argue that
efforts by law enforcement agencies that target minority communities
stigmatize those communities and generate a cultural resentment towards
87. N.W.A., Fuck Tha Police, on STRAIGHr OUr OF COMPTON (Priority Records 1988).
88. Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 669, 670 (1998).
89. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1273-74 (1994).
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the officers and the courts.?o This stigmatism is so prevalent, it has caused
scholar Paul Butler to call for rational subversions of the criminal justice
system.9'
In Wardlow, these two viewpoints found their way into competing
briefs of Amicus Curiae. Predictably, the already oft-cited NAPO brief
embraces the Cheerleader argument, while the brief authored by the
NAACP views law enforcement efforts in a more skeptical light. The
NAPO brief basically takes its argument from the views of Randall Ken-
nedy, and states that minorities express a greater concern about crime
and are more commonly victims of crimes than whites.9 Therefore, since
minorities are concerned about crime and are victimized by crime, it is
logical (though unstated in the brief) that minority communities gener-
ally favor police cracking down on crime in their neighborhoods. This
argument is obtusely paternalistic. The NAPO fails to establish a causal
link between their statistical research and the solution they support. As
discussed below, practices of law enforcement that are based on indica-
tors external to the criminal actors themselves, actually adversely affect a
minority community's relationship with the criminal justice system, and
fosters a lionization of the criminals.
Regina Austin terms this phenomenon the politics of identification.93
Austin points out that black communities regard the behavior of its
members in terms of racial progress. 4 Austin admits that members of the
black community recognize that crime stigmatizes the community and
impedes upon the social progress of the race9 However, the community
also realizes that the criminal aspects are within the community and tend
to equate criminal behavior with race resistance. 96
The basis of a high-crime area merely perpetuates this lionization.
The identification of criminals in the black community, and their equa-
tion with race resistance, stems from a group recognition that the major-
ity society has unfairly used indicators beyond community control, like
90. See Jody David Armour, Bring the Noise, 40 B.C. L. REV. 733, 735 (1999) (while touring
a prison Armour comments on the "deep sense of connectedness and sympathy that law-abiding
blacks feel toward their wayward sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers,
friends and cousins, as well as toward blacks they don't know personally but with whom they share a
common plight in a racially oppressive society."); Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of
Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1280 (1998) (stating that "[the effect of
increased law enforcement] is severe. It contributes to the growing legal disenfranchisement of
African-Americans, to the poverty of children, and to the breakup of the family.").
91. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995).
92. NAPO Brief, supra note 63, at 23.
93. Regina Austin, "The Black Community": Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 1769 (1989).
94. Id. at 1772.
95. Id. at 1773.
96. Id. at 1774.
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race, to identify certain behavioral patterns within the community. This
stigmatization is arbitrary, and therefore the community members lose
faith in the societal agents that appear to perpetuate the stigma, namely
the police. 97 The Eazy E quote that heads this section is a manifestation
of that loss of faith. Just as race is beyond a person's control, so too is a
person's residence in a high-crime community. Due to the politics of past
and present racism, minority members are often forced to live in poverty-
stricken, crime-riddled communities, and this segregation continues de-
spite race-neutral policies.9 Therefore, the high-crime area designation as
a basis for increased legal justification of police, and diminished expecta-
tions of privacy for residents, only perpetuate this distrust and the politics
of identification.
While the loss of trust in governmental agencies represents an intrin-
sic evil to society, Professor Armour shows that the effects can go be-
yond the community's perception of state actors and infect the very po-
litical structure of the community itself. Armour describes the "chilling
effect" the stigmatization of high crime has on group participation in
community affairs. 99 Law abiding blacks who fear being identified as
criminal tend to avoid public places, and when they do venture out, the
self expression necessary to be an active member of society is stifled, lest
they appear threatening.' °° Therefore, the label of high-crime area canhave a multitude of adverse impacts upon large minority populations.
The racially disadvantageous effects described are merely risks asso-
ciated with the high-crime label. However, risks can render probabilistic
data-even data that appears to be rational--unreasonable.'0 ' This final
argument goes to the heart of the issue in Wardlow, because reasonable-
ness is the foundation for all Fourth Amendment analysis that does not
involve a warrant, including Terry stops.
Armour illustrates how a rational probability can be unreasonable,
depending on the risk associated with the probability. He does so with a
hypothetical scenario concerning his "temperamental Rottweiler. ' ' If he
chains the pooch up in the yard three hours before he goes to bed, and his
wife asks at bedtime if the dog is restrained, his affirmative response is
both rational and reasonable. 03Even if the dog has gotten off the leash in
97. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Legal Defense & Educational Fund at 16 [hereinafter NAACP Brief], Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119 (2000) (98-1036) ("Many black Americans are disaffected and suspicious. They are not
confident that the police will be fair.").
98. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
in CRMCAL RACE THEORY, supra note 69, at 449, 452.
99. See ARMOUR, supra note 76, at 52.
100. See id
101. See id. at 50.
102. Id at 48.
103. See id.
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the intervening time, the only consequence of him not checking is minor
property damage to the patio furniture.' O° However, if the same situation
exists not at bedtime, but just prior to a one-year-old child entering the
back yard, the rational response that the dog is chained becomes unrea-
sonable due to the risk of severe injury to the child.c'
This example illustrates how high-crime is a delineation can at once
be a rational manifestation of statistical probabilities on its own, and
when combined with the risk of unequal racial application, it can be an
unreasonable factor in predicting crime or threat.
II. FLIGHT
The decision in Wardlow has two aspects, location and evasion. The
Court states that Sam was legally stopped because he was both in a high-
crime area and fled unprovoked upon seeing the cops.'06 While this paper
has primarily focused on high-crime areas, it was the flight aspect of the
case that gathered headlines across the country. Therefore, negligence
follows the omission of the subject from a discussion of this case.
As argued above, the concept of a high-crime area should not be con-
sidered a circumstance in the totality of the circumstances of Terry
analysis. This argument is more difficult to make with regard to evasion.
Unlike high-crime area, fleeing police presence is a conscious action by
the person who flees. The behavior is specific to the person who under-
takes it, and is reflective of an internal intention, however benign the
intention might be. The idea that police officers and courts reviewing
arrests should consider flight appeals to our commonsense. The Court
unanimously held that a person's "unprovoked flight" can be a factor in
reasonable articulable suspicion."" This section shows the problems that
the flight factor creates.
The Court repeatedly categorized Mr. Wardlow's flight as unpro-
voked, without citing a distinction between provoked and unprovoked
flight.'O' The Court's analysis suggests that Officer Nolan did nothing to
cause Mr. Wardlow to run,and if Officer Nolan had pulled a gun and
began firing it into the air, Mr. Wardlow's flight would have been pro-
voked. This interpretation follows the logic of courts who look only at
cases in terms of the actions of the specific defendant and the specific
police officer discussed in Section Two, supra. If, however, courts cast a
broader view on the term "unprovoked" and incorporate matters such as
104. See id.
105. See id. at 48-9.





biased policing and the relationship between minority citizens and the
police, it is difficult to conceive of an unprovoked flight from a police
officer by a minority resident of inner-city America.
A. Statistics from the Inner City
On December 22, 1994, Officer Francis Livotti choked Anthony
Baez to death."O9 On August 9, 1997 five officers from New York City
Police Department's (NYPD) 70"' Precinct raped and tortured Abner
Louima with a broom-handle in the precinct bathroom." On February 4,
1999, four officers hailed 41 bullets and killed Amadou Diallo outside
his Harlem residence."' Each incident involved violence against a person
of color by white members of the NYPD. These incidences brought an-
ger and protest from the minority communities of New York City."2
They also brought about an investigation into the practices of the NYPD
by the New York Office of the Attorney General (OAG)."3
On March 18, 1999, OAG began investigating the practices of the
NYPD, and specifically focused their efforts on "stop and frisk" prac-
tices. 114 The report looked at 175,000 forms filled out by police officers
whenever a "stop and frisk" was performed for a 15 month period in
1998 and 1999.' OAG then utilized statistical analysis and regressions
to determine the role of race on the practice of "stop and frisks" within
the city." 6 While probably coming as little surprise to the minority popu-
lations of New York City, the report categorically concluded, "minori-
ties-and blacks in particular-were 'stopped' at a higher rate than
whites relative to their respective percentages within the population."
' 7
In New York City, blacks comprise 25.6% of the population, yet
approximately half of all the stops were performed on black residents." 8
Blacks were more than twice as likely to be stopped on suspicion of
109. See Greg Wilson, Choke Victim is Honored, City Renames Bronx Street in Memory
of Anthony Baez, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 31, 2000, at 1.
110. Bob Liff, Pols Push for Change in the NYPD, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, March 29, 1999,
at 1.
11. Leslie Casimir et al., Crowd Voices Anger, Sorrow, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, February
14, 1999, at 5.
112. See id.
113. See THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: A REPORT
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/ stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html, visited February
19,2001.
114. Id. at 1.
115. See THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS "STOP& FRISK" PRACTICES: A REPORT
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/
stop frisk/executive_summary.htm], visited February 19, 2001 [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
116. Seeid.at2-3.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id.
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committing a violent crime and carrying a weapon than whites, and were
stopped a staggering 62.7% of the time by the NYPD's Street Crime
Unit 9-- the same unit that shot 41 bullets at Amadou Diallo.'20 However,
even though the minority populations of New York were subject to
greater numbers of stops, the stops were less likely to lead to a finding of
probable cause to arrest than the stops of whites. 2' The Street Crime Unit
performed 16 times the number of stops without arrests on blacks th an
stops with arrests, while the NYPD stopped whites less than eight times
for every white arrest.2 Therefore, even though their accuracy for suspi-
cion of criminality was higher for whites, the NYPD nevertheless
stopped blacks at a greater rate. In fact, where the stop involved a frisk of
the suspect or other physical force, blacks were more frequently stopped
without reasonable suspicion than were whites.' 23
The starkness of the results of the investigation requires further com-
ment. The report shows that in precincts of predominately minority
populations, the police performed a greater number of stops. In precincts
with a majority of white residents, the disparity between minority make-
up of the community and the stop rates for minorities is even greater.'14
The nine precincts with the greatest numbers of stops per cagita were
composed of populations in which whites were the minority. In pre-
cincts where whites constituted a majority and blacks and Hispanics
comprised less than 10% of the total population, black and Hispanics
constituted 53.4% of people who were stopped. 26 This shows that mi-
norities who lived in predominately minority neighborhoods faced stops
occurring more frequently than whites in their neighborhood, while mi-
norities living in predominately white areas were stopped at a rate two to
three times greater than their representation in the community.
Though the results of the report are drastic, they do not account for
underreporting by police units of the number of people stopped and127
searched. Nevertheless, the report confirmed the suspicions and emo-
tions of many within the minority communities of New York.'2s The re-
port, while only concerning the Metropolitan area of Gotham City, lends
119. Id. at 3.
120. See Alice McQuillan, Patrol Units Big on Gun Arrest, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, February 5,
1999, at 5.
121. See EXECUnVE SUMMDARY, supra note 115, at 4.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 8.
124. See id. at 3-4.
125. See id at 3.
126. Id at 3.
127. See Richard Perez-Pena, Police May Have Understated Street Searches, Spitzer Says,
N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1999, at B4 (stating that the Attorney General himself suggested that more
stops took place than reported by police).
128. Police Tactics in Question, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A16.
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credence to the strong criticisms of police/minority relationships
throughout America.'29
Where a group of people is subjected to harassment, brutality, and
systematic injustice to the point where faith is lost in the people hired to
protect them,130 what amount of narrow arrogance is required to state that
a black man, who flees a white officer, did so unprovoked? The police
forces around the country that have practiced biased policing provoke the
subjects of their profile to flee their arbitrary and injurious pursuits. The
flight of Sam Wardlow was not unprovoked. Instead, it was a justifiable
response to an unjust system.
CONCLUSION
The case of Sam Wardlow illustrates the difficulties our country
faces in maintaining the effective enforcement of our criminal laws. The
criminal system as a whole needs to broaden its perspective; if we are to
cure the systems racial ills, criminal courts must look beyond the caption
of the case. The case of Sam Wardlow has greater significance than its
primer-simple facts suggest. Wardlow is not about one man running from
another. It is about the neighborhoods where we live, and the toll crime
has taken on them. It is about how we make decisions, and how we ask
police officers to perform some of the most difficult tasks our nation
requires. Our criminal courts must begin to take into account the prac-
tices of police officers and the effects those practices have on our com-
munities and our very idea of criminality.
129. See, e.g., NAACP Brief, supra note 97, at 16.
130. See id.
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